Case 8DDFB3 · Cloud · L4 Advanced
Global Admin Grabbed Root Scope
Live alertAzure Activity Log at 22:05 records Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action by admin.k, followed by Owner role assignments on three production subscriptions from the same account.
- 01 What happened?
- 02 What is the impact?
- 03 What do you do?
What a strong answer covers
Try it out loud first. Then check yourself:
- A Global Admin used elevate access, gaining User Access Administrator at root scope over every subscription
- This bridges Entra to Azure: a compromised GA can grant itself any role; legitimate use is rare, like recovering access
- Triage: confirm with admin.k out of band; check the sign-in risk, location, MFA and other recent GA actions
- Contain if malicious: remove root and new Owner assignments, revoke sessions, review run commands, Key Vault and storage keys
- Prevent: Global Admin only through PIM, very few GAs, phishing-resistant MFA, and an alert on every elevateAccess
If the interviewer pushes back
- Why is Global Admin effectively owner of every Azure subscription even with no Azure RBAC role assigned?