Case 8544C0 · Cloud · L3 Applied
Buckets Emptied, Note Left
Live alertAt 03:20 CloudTrail shows the ci-deploy IAM user access key, from an unfamiliar IP, calling PutBucketVersioning (Suspended) on prod-invoices, then thousands of DeleteObject calls and one PutObject: README-RECOVER.txt.
- 01 What happened?
- 02 What is the impact?
- 03 What do you do?
What a strong answer covers
Try it out loud first. Then check yourself:
- Extortion with a long-lived key: attacker likely copied data first, then deleted it and left a ransom note
- Suspending versioning keeps existing versions; check ListObjectVersions and DeleteObject calls with version IDs
- Contain: deactivate the key, attach an explicit deny, and look for new users, keys or roles that key created
- Prove exfil: GetObject needs S3 data events; without them rely on server access logs, billing and network metrics
- Prevent: no static CI keys, Object Lock or AWS Backup copies, SCP denying versioning changes, alert on mass deletes
If the interviewer pushes back
- What if the attacker re-encrypted objects with SSE-C using their own key instead of deleting them?