Case 006B9A · Cryptography · L3 Applied
Certificate Transparency
- 01 What is it?
- 02 How is it abused?
- 03 How do you stop it?
What a strong answer covers
Try it out loud first. Then check yourself:
- CT (RFC 6962) puts publicly trusted TLS certs in append-only Merkle-tree logs, so mis-issuance becomes publicly visible.
- CAs submit a precertificate and embed the returned SCTs; Chrome and Safari reject public certs without enough valid SCTs.
- Abuse it tackles: rogue or compromised CAs issuing certs for your domains, or attackers getting certs via domain takeover.
- Defend by monitoring CT for your domains (crt.sh, CT monitors) and setting CAA records so only your chosen CAs may issue.
- Downside: CT logs leak internal hostnames to recon; use wildcards or private CAs for names you do not want listed.
If the interviewer pushes back
- CT detects mis-issuance after the fact. What stops a rogue cert being used in the window before you notice and revoke it?