Case 0398ED · Identity & AD · L2 Practitioner
Device Code Phishing
- 01 What is it?
- 02 How is it abused?
- 03 How do you stop it?
What a strong answer covers
Try it out loud first. Then check yourself:
- Device authorization grant (RFC 8628): an input-limited device shows a code, the user enters it on a verification page
- Abuse: attacker starts the flow, sends the victim the code with a pretext, then polls and receives the tokens
- Victim signs in on the real IdP domain with real MFA, so URL checks and even passkeys do not stop it
- Attacker gets access and refresh tokens; the refresh token gives persistence until it is revoked
- Stop: block device code flow via Conditional Access except for named needs; hunt sign-ins with protocol deviceCode
If the interviewer pushes back
- Why does phishing-resistant MFA fail here when it stops AiTM proxies, and what control actually closes the gap?