Case CEC64E · Web AppSec · L3 Applied
Reset Links Point Elsewhere
Live alertWAF logs on shop-web-02 show 37 POST /api/password-reset requests at 03:12 UTC carrying X-Forwarded-Host: acc0unt-help.net. By 09:00, three of those accounts had passwords changed from one VPS IP.
- 01 What happened?
- 02 What is the impact?
- 03 What do you do?
What a strong answer covers
Try it out loud first. Then check yourself:
- Password reset poisoning: the app builds the reset URL from the Host or X-Forwarded-Host header the attacker controls
- Victim gets a genuine email whose link points at the attacker domain; one click leaks the token, then the account is taken
- Impact: account takeover; scope every reset sent with a foreign host and every token used from unfamiliar IPs
- Respond: invalidate outstanding reset tokens and sessions for affected users, force re-reset, notify, block the domain
- Fix: build links from a configured canonical base URL; strip or allowlist forwarding headers at the proxy
If the interviewer pushes back
- Could this still work if the victim never clicks the link? Think about email security scanners and link previews.