Case FD41F2 · Blue team / DFIR · L3 Applied
EDR Went Quiet on Three Servers
Live alertAt 03:40 the EDR console shows DB-01, DB-02 and APP-07 last checked in at 02:58. On DB-01, Event 7045 logged a new kernel driver service at 02:55, then the EDR service stopped (Event 7036).
- 01 What happened?
- 02 What is the impact?
- 03 What do you do?
What a strong answer covers
Try it out loud first. Then check yourself:
- A new driver right before the sensor died suggests bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver: a signed, flawed driver used to kill EDR.
- Blinding EDR is a hands-on-keyboard step usually taken just before ransomware or mass exfiltration; treat it as an active intrusion.
- Contain without the EDR: isolate the hosts at the switch, firewall or hypervisor, and find who logged on (4624) shortly before 02:55.
- Collect memory and the dropped driver, check backups are offline and intact, and hunt for the same driver hash and service name fleet-wide.
- Prevent: EDR tamper protection, the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist with HVCI, and an alert on any sensor that stops reporting.
If the interviewer pushes back
- The attacker had domain admin. Which of your containment tools still work if they can log on to your EDR console too?