Case C4BA63 · Blue team / DFIR · L3 Applied
Purple Team Beat the Rule
Live alertIn a purple-team exercise the red team Kerberoasted 30 service accounts and cracked two. Your Kerberoasting detection never fired: it alerts on event 4769 with RC4 encryption (0x17), and the red team requested AES tickets.
Interview questionYour Kerberoasting detection missed a purple-team attack. How do you fix the detection, not just this case?
- 01 What happened?
- 02 What is the impact?
- 03 What do you do?
What a strong answer covers
Try it out loud first. Then check yourself:
- The rule tested a common implementation, not the technique: attackers can request AES tickets too, they are just slower to crack.
- Detect the behaviour: one account requesting service tickets for many different SPNs in a short window, whatever the encryption type.
- Add a honeypot service account with an SPN that nothing legitimate uses; any ticket request for it is high confidence.
- Add the AES variant to your test suite, and review other rules for the same "one tool, one string" assumption.
If the interviewer pushes back
- The two cracked accounts had 12-character passwords. What do you change beyond the detection?